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Recent Developments 
Lettley v. State 
Trial Court's Denial of Defense Counsel's Motion to Withdraw Based on Conflict 
of Interest Violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of 
Counsel 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a trial 
court's denial of defense counsel's 
motion to withdraw, due to a conflict 
of interest violated the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel. Lettley v. 
State, 358 Md. 26, 746 A.2d 392 
(2000). The court further held that 
an attorney's applicable conflict of 
interest was not limited to multiple 
representation in the same case, but 
could also be created by the attorney's 
dual representation of the client and a 
third person, where the third person 
is not a party to the client's case. 
Timothy Smith ("Smith") was 
shot three times at a parking lot in 
Baltimore City on December 10, 
1997. After recovering from his 
injuries, Smith identified Donald 
Lettley ("Lettley") from a photo array 
as the shooter. Lettley was indicted 
by a Grand Jury in Baltimore City for 
attempted first degree murder and 
related offenses. Lettley privately 
retained an attorney on February 11, 
1998. 
On August 17, 1998, Lettley's 
attorney informed the court that she 
had a conflict of interest and requested 
that the court grant her motion to 
withdraw her appearance. The 
attorney told the court that an existing 
client, who was not the defendant in 
the instant case, had come to her in 
confidence implicating himself in the 
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Smith shooting. The attorney 
informed the court that her ability to 
effectively represent Lettley had thus 
been compromised, as it would force 
her to reveal confidential information 
that could harm another client, not a 
party to the instant case. After the 
court questioned the attorney 
regarding the· alleged conflict, the 
judge permitted Lettley to consult with 
an independent counsel, who agreed 
there was a conflict of interest. 
Nevertheless, the judge denied 
Lettley's request for a postponement 
and advised Lettley that he had two 
options: to proceed with his present 
counsel or discharge her and proceed 
pro se. Lettley proceeded with his 
present counsel and was subsequently 
convicted for attempted murder and 
possession of a handgun. 
Lettley filed a timely appeal to 
the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, claiming that the trial judge 
denied him effective assistance of 
counsel as guaranteed to him under 
the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States ConstitUtion and Article 21 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted a writ of certiorari on its own 
motion sua sponte. 
The court of appeals first pointed 
out that typically claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel are reviewed on 
post-conviction, not direct appeal. 
Lettley, 358 Md. at 32, 746 A.2d at 
395. However, because the claim 
involved a conflict of interest and the 
trial record was clear, the need to 
wait until a post conviction hearing 
was eliminated. Id. The court then 
addressed the fundamental protection 
of the Sixth Amendment and Article 
21 guarantees of a criminal 
defendant's right to effective 
assistance of counsel. Id. ·at 33, 746 
A.2d at 396. According to the court, 
effective assistance of counsel 
includes the right to have 
representation absent conflicting 
interests. Id. at 34, 746 A.2d at 396. 
The court explained that while a 
typical conflict of interest issue arises 
in multiple representation settings, a 
defendant's right to "conflict free" 
representation continues in any 
situation in which the defense counsel 
has a conflicting obligation to both the 
defendant and some other party. Id 
at 34, 746 A.2d at 397. 
Generally, the standard that a 
defendant must meet in order to 
prove ineffective assistance of 
counsel is relatively high, ~ set forth 
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Id. The 
defendant must prove that his 
counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness 
and that the defendant was 
prejudiced. Id. However, the court 
of appeals pointed out that where the 
claim sterns from a conflict ofinterest, 
the strict standard in Strickland does 
not apply. Jd. The court pointed to 
two United States Supreme Court 
approaches to the conflict of interest 
based claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and explained that the 
determining factor used by that court 
was whether the conflict was noted 
on the record. Id. at 35, 746 A.2d at 
397. If the defense counsel makes a 
timely objection as to the conflict, and 
a conflict is said to actually exist, then 
deference should be given to the 
defense attorney and the court should 
take adequate measures to ensure that 
the defendant's rights are not violated. 
Id. at 35-37, 746 A.2d at 397-98. 
(citing Glasser v. Us., 315 U.S. 60, 
69 (1942); Holloway v. Arkansas, 
435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978)). The 
existence of the conflict itself is said 
to be inherently prejudicial, as the evil 
is what the defense attorney is 
compelled to refrain from doing. Jd. 
However, if the defense counsel fails 
to make a timely objection, thus 
denying the court the ability to correct 
the situation, the defendant must prove 
that the actual conflict adversely 
affected his counsel's performance 
(citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335 (1980)). Id at 37, 746 A.2d at 
398. Once the conflict and the 
adverse effect are illustrated, 
prejudice is presumed. Id. 
The court reviewed the last case 
seen in Maryland regarding ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Id. at 41, 746 
A.2d at 401. In Austin v. State, 327 
Md. 375,609 A.2d 728 (1992), two 
lawyers from the same law firm 
represented co-defendants in a 
criminal case. Id. Once again, the 
court reiterated the language of the 
United States Supreme Court and 
said that once a conflict is determined 
to exist, prejudice is presumed and 
the court should take steps to 
eliminate the conflict. Jd. at42, 746 
A.2dat 401. 
In the present case, Lettley' s 
defense counsel had confidential 
information from one client that was 
crucial to the case of another client. 
Id. at43, 746 A.2d at 402. Because 
of ethical obligations to the previous 
client, counsel was prohibited from 
using it to fulfil yet another ethical duty 
to her current client; the duty to 
represent a client zealously. Id. at 44, 
746 A.2d at 402. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland found the 
constraint obvious. Id. As counsel 
made a timely objection, the trial court 
abused its discretion by not allowing 
her to withdraw her representation 
and therefore violated Lettley' s Sixth 
Amendment rights. Jd. at 45, 746 
A.2dat403. 
The fundamental right for a 
defendant to' receive a fair trial 
resonates throughout this opinion. 
However, the possibility that this 
decision could be used to cause delay 
within the system could become a 
reality. Applying this decision to the 
heavy case-load of the Public 
Defender's Office, it appears that 
there will be times when finding a 
"conflict-free" representation will be 
extremely difficult. A public 
defender's client list is often vast, with 
many overlaps. Yet the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland seems to reason 
that any obstacle presented in fmding 
representation is not as paramount as 
a defendant's right to effective 
assistance of counsel. 
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